📜 Baba Kamma — 11a

This means that the bailee should bring witnesses that the animal was mauled through circumstances beyond his control, and based on their testimony he is exempt from liability. Abba Shaul says: The word ed should not be interpreted as witness, but as carcass. Accordingly, the bailee should immediately bring the carcass [aduda] to court in order to appraise its current value. What, is it not so that they disagree about this matter: That one Sage, Abba Shaul, holds that the loss due to the diminishing value of the carcass is sustained by the injured party, and so there is a need to appraise its value immediately in order to correctly assess how much the one liable for the damage must pay, and the other Sage, the first tanna, holds that the loss due to the diminishing value of the carcass is sustained by the one liable for the damage because the Torah granted him ownership of it. The Gemara rejects this: No, everyone agrees that the loss due to the diminishing value of the carcass is sustained by the injured party, since he owns it, and here they disagree concerning who must go to the effort of retrieving the carcass and transporting it to the court to be appraised. And so it is taught in a baraita: Others say: From where is it derived that it is incumbent upon the owner of the pit to raise the ox from his pit after it was killed by falling into it? The verse states: “The owner of the pit shall pay; he shall restore money to its owner, and the carcass shall be his” (Exodus 21:34). They read the term “and the carcass” as a second subject of the term “he shall restore.” It therefore indicates that the one liable for the damage must restore the carcass to the injured party by retrieving it. The fact that this opinion is introduced with the phrase: Others say, suggests that it stands in opposition to another opinion. That other opinion apparently holds that the owner of the injured animal is responsible for retrieving the carcass. Abaye said to Rava: What are the circumstances in which the one liable for the damage is required to go to this effort, to retrieve the carcass from the pit? If we say that while still inside the pit, the carcass is worth a dinar, and when it is at the edge of the pit, since it is more accessible, its market value increases and is worth four dinars, then when the one liable for the damage expends the effort to retrieve the carcass, he is expending the effort for his own sake, since by increasing the value of the carcass he reduces his own liability. Therefore, he will certainly retrieve it of his own accord, and it is not necessary for the Torah to require him to do so. Rava said to him: No, it is necessary to require him to retrieve the carcass in a case where, while still inside the pit the carcass is worth one dinar, and when it is at the edge of the pit, despite being more accessible, it is still worth one dinar. Since it is of no benefit to him to retrieve it, the Torah had to require him to do so. The Gemara asks: But is there ever a case like this, where despite being more accessible its market value does not change? The Gemara answers: Yes, as people say, a beam of wood in the city sells for a dinar, and a beam of wood in the field also sells for a dinar, despite the fact that it needs to be transported from there to the city. § Shmuel says: The practice of the court is that when an animal or other item is stolen and then is damaged or dies, the court does not appraise its current value and assign ownership of it to its owner, in order that the perpetrator should have to pay only the difference between its prior value and its current value, neither for the sake of a thief nor for the sake of a robber. Rather, the thief or robber acquires ownership of the carcass or damaged item and compensates the owner for its prior value. The court appraises the item or carcass only for damages, as the Gemara explained above. And I say that they appraise the item or animal even for a borrower who borrowed an item and while it was in his possession it became damaged, or who borrowed an animal and while it was in his possession it died, and Abba, i.e., Rav, concedes to me. A dilemma was raised before them: Is this what Shmuel is saying: The court appraises the value of an item or a carcass even for the sake of a borrower, and Abba concedes to me; or perhaps, this is what Shmuel is saying: And I say that the court does not appraise its value even for a borrower, and Abba concedes to me? Come and hear a resolution from the following incident: There was a certain man who borrowed an ax from another and he broke it. He came before Rav to rule if, and how much, he was liable to pay for it. Rav said to him: Go and pay him with a full-fledged ax, i.e., you must compensate the owner for the full value of the ax that you broke. The Gemara suggests: Conclude from it that the court does not appraise its value for the sake of a borrower. The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, from the fact that Rav Kahana and Rav Asi said to Rav on that occasion: Is this the halakha? And Rav remained silent, this suggests that he conceded to their opinion that the borrower should not have had to pay the full value of the ax. Accordingly, conclude from it that the court appraises an item’s value for the sake of a borrower. An amoraic dispute was stated: Ulla says that Rabbi Elazar says: The court appraises a stolen item’s value for a thief and for a robber. Rav Pappi says: It does not appraise its value for them. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that the court does not appraise value either for a thief or for a robber; but it appraises value for a borrower, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Kahana and Rav Asi. § The Gemara cites additional halakhot taught by Ulla, citing Rabbi Elazar: When a woman gives birth or miscarries a fetus she is thereby rendered ritually impure (see Leviticus 12:1–5). Even if she delivers only the afterbirth, with no discernible fetus, she is rendered ritually impure due to the possibility that the fetus was dissolved in the afterbirth, and it is therefore considered as though she delivered it (Nidda 24b). The length of the period of impurity depends on the sex of the child. In the case where it is unclear what the sex is, she must observe the longer period of fourteen days (Nidda 29a). At the end of that period she may purify herself by immersing in a ritual bath. And Ulla says that Rabbi Elazar says: If part of the afterbirth [shilya] emerged on the first day of a woman’s miscarriage and part of it emerged on the second day, one counts the period of ritual impurity from the first day. Rava said to him, to Ulla: What is the rationale for your opinion to begin counting from the first day? It would appear to be based on the following: Ritual impurity is engendered only once the woman has delivered the fetus. This is defined as the emergence of the majority of the fetus or its head. Since in this case the fetus is not discernible, one must consider the possibility that it had already emerged on the first day, and therefore one is required to act stringently and regard her as impure from the first day. Rava questions the propriety of acting stringently in this case, as it is a stringency that results in a leniency, because if she begins counting from the first day, you will also render her fit to immerse and become pure from fourteen days after the first day. This is a leniency because it is possible that the majority of the fetus emerged only on the second day and therefore her period of impurity began only then. She will therefore remain impure until the fifteenth day. Rather, Rava said: With regard to being concerned for the possibility that she is impure from the first day, she should be concerned. But with regard to counting the period of impurity, one counts only from the second day. The Gemara asks: What is Ulla teaching us through this halakha? Does he mean to teach us that part of the afterbirth does not emerge without part of the fetus inside? But we already learned that in a mishna (Ḥullin 77a): When an animal is ritually slaughtered, the animal and everything inside it becomes permitted for consumption. This applies to an unborn fetus as well. If prior to the slaughter the majority of the fetus emerged, it is considered to have been born, and therefore the entire fetus, even the part that is still within its mother, is not rendered permitted for consumption by the slaughter. Accordingly, if part of the afterbirth emerged prior to the slaughter, it is prohibited to eat it, because an afterbirth is a sign of a fetus in a woman and a sign of a fetus in an animal. The Gemara explains: If I would know this only from the mishna, I would say